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1. Introduction 
The agricultural credit system in Jamaica experienced 
substantial growth, institutional changes and financial difficul-
ties in the past decade. In many ways the experience of the 
system as a whole and the various institutional strategies to 
deal with the problems of credit supply illustrate the classic 
dilemmas of agricultural finance in LDC's. This history takes 
on special poignancy in the light of the island's economic 
difficulties in the post 1974 recession-energy deficit world 
and the hopes, inspired in the early 1970s, that a new democratic 
political order with a socialist program would guide Jamaica's. 
future. A political mandate for increased public sector 
activity and redistributive policies coincided with a shift in 
world economic conditions that severely compromised the island's 
growth potential. This scenario should be kept in mind as the 
context within which changes in rural credit institutions and 
strategies occurred. 
Economic Growth and Stagnation 
During the late sixties and early seventies,. the Jamaican 
economy registered respectable rates of g.row th (six percent for 
real Gross Domestic Product) al though this w< ; IJPt true of the 
agricultural sector which declined at an average annual rate of 
*Revised and condensed version of a paper entitled. "Agricultural 
Credit and Rural Progress in Jamaica: A Development Dilemma" 
presented at Workshop on Rural Financial Markets and.Institutions, 
Wye College, England, June 1979. 
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four percent. During the mid-seventies, however, there was a 
severe economic recession. Total real gr9ss domestic product 
decreased by 2.8 percent per annum between 1973 and. 1978, 
negative ~rowth being recorded in each of .the last five years. 
Key sectors such as mining, manufacturing, construction, and 
commerce declined at average annual rates of three percent, 
seven percent, 10 .percent, and eight percent respectively. 
The agricultural sector was the only productive sector to 
experience positive growth (three percent per annum) over the 
same period. 
This dismal economic growth experience was associated with 
sharp contractions in domestic savings and investment. Domestic 
savings which averaged 17 percent of gross national product in 
between 1965 and 1970, averaged only 10 percent between 1971 and 
1975, becoming negative thereafter. Though foreign investment 
helped to boost real national savings early in the decade, 
real net capital formation contracted almost continuously from 
J$250 million in 1970 to J$29 million in 1977. 
The growing deficit in the balance of payments has had a 
seriously debilitating effect on the economy. Net foreign reserves 
fell from J$130 million in 1974 to minus J$19·6 million in 1977 
to place ·Jamaica on the verge of international bankruptcy. A 
sharp, prolonged decline in export earnings combined with .an 
inability to reduce imports sufficiently led to this state of 
affairs. Domestic. inflation also accelerated during. this period, 
largely as a result of the growing public sector deficit and 
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rising imp.Ort prices •.. ~nnual inflation rates· (using the •. 
Consumer Price Index as the measure}, rose from 9. percent .in 
1972 to 48 percent in 1978. 
'Stagflation' affected .the financial sector. Government 
debt increased substantially as a proportion of commercial bank 
assets (from 11. percent in 1970 to 33 percent in 1977). 
Commercial banks increased their holdings of government 
securities because the decline in aggregate demand and credit 
ceilings reduced private sector.demand for bank credit, and 
because legal liquid assets reserve requirements were periodically 
increased. Interest rates, ranging between two percent and .12 
percent on bank deposits, and seven percent and 12 percent on 
government securities during the past five years, did not keep 
pace with inflation. Negative real rates of interest ranging 
between eight and 40 percent prevailed. Consequently, savers 
have subsidized borrowers. 
In summary, the Jamaican economy experienced a long economic 
recession since 1972. Exports declined, balance of payments 
deficits grew, arid inflation rose to unaccustomed levels 
contributing. to a negative real .. rate of interest situation in 
Which savings are penalized and borrowing subsidized. The 
agricultural sector has been the one principal area experienc:i_:r;ig 
some degree of positive growth. 
The extent to which substantial credit. fl11ws contributed to 
. Z::· \','>;; 
Jamaican agricultural performance is a matter of some controversy. 
In what follows, we describe and appraise, the performance of the 
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agricultural credit system. The main thrust of our analysis 
is that fundamental weaknesses in the design and operation of the· 
public sector credit programs; as well as the general and .. 
sectoral economic disequilibrium,which undermined the effectiveness 
and viability of rural credit programs in Jamaica. 
II. The National Network of Agricultural Credit--
Growth, Institutional Change and Performance 
A. Growth 
There have been five major formal sources of agricultural 
credit in Jamaica throughout the 1970s: the commercial banks; 
the Agricultural Credit Board; the Jamaica Development Bank; 
the Self-Supporting Farmers Development Program; and the Crop 
Lien Program. Commercial banks are the largest single source 
of credit to the agricultural sector. This credit is largely • 
short term and goes to medium sized and larger farmers with 
good credit ratings and limited risks. In more recent years 
the commercial bank network has extended loans to large govern-
ment agricultural cooperatives such as the sugar cooperatives 
which bought out the former large sugar estates that had been 
in private hands. 
The remaining agricultural credit sources are public sector 
.institutions or programs. The oldest .of these public institutions 
is the Agricultural Credit Board created in 1960 ... This institution 
has two.portfolios: one serving larger. farmers through direct 
loans; .the other aimed at small farmers and channeled through 
the national network of small people's cooperative banks. 
• 
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Loans in both cases are largely short term and seasonal and, 
in the case of the people's cooperative banks, includes small 
loans as well. 
The Jamaica Development Bank began making large, medium to 
long term "development" loans to essentially medium to large 
farmers ,from 1969 onwards. The Small Farmer Development Program 
was also established in 1969. It makes medium to long term 
loans to much smaller farmers than those serviced by the 
Jamaica Development Bank. Limitations on farm acreage, gross 
sales and assets have created a clientele for the SSFDP that 
can best be characterized as medium sized farmer. Finally, 
there is the Crop Lien Program created by the government in 
1977 and admini~tered by the Ministry of Agriculture through 
their ex.tension agents in conjunction with the people's cooperative 
banks which disburse these loans. Crop Lien loans are strictly 
small, short term and seasonal, limited to domestic foodstuff 
producers and focused on small farmers with little or no 
previous loan experience. 
Table 1 summarizes the growth of formal agricultural credit 
through these five major sources. Although loans outstanding in 
nominal terms grew almost seven fold in eight years, this 
increase was only two times in real terms, reflecting the 
inflatiopary erosion of the capital base for agricultural .lending. 1 
1The largeY rise in loans outstanding between 974 and 1975 (Table 1) 
is partially due to a change in the Bank of , amaica's classifica-
tion of. agricultural loans reported by commercial banks in l~ns. 
some kihds of loans which had previously been reported under 
distributed trades and other sectors were hereafter listed as agri-
culture. It is estimated that slightly less than half of the net 
increase in loans outstanding from 1974 to 1975 were due to this 
change in classification (Graham, Bourne and Begashaw, 1978, 
Ch. IV) • 
TABLE 1 
Total Loans Outstanding to Agric:::ulture in Jamaica In. 
-Current and 1970 Dollars: 1979-1977 
Total Agricultural Loans Outstanding Tn Current Values 
And In 1970 Dollars (End of Year Balances) 
Year 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
Current Values 
(J $000) 
(1) 
25,320 
30,557 
35,162 
49,005 
60,060 
112, 74.3 
136,715 
165,821 
167,821 
In 1970 
Dollars 
(J $000) 
(2) 
25,320 
28,558 
32,141 
37,041 
34,817 
55,731 
61,088 
65,207 
51,605 
6 
Sources: Statistical Digest (Bank of Jamaica, various 
years; . . , 
Monetary Statistics (Department of Statistics),. 
various years; 
Annual Reports of the Jamaica Development Bank, 
Self-Supporting Farmers Development Program. 
Note: The Implicit GDP deflator was used to correct for 
inflation. 
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• In 1978 there was practically rio chang.e in amount of credit 
in nominal terms, and. a pronounced contraction in .,real> terms. 
B. Institutional Changes 
Table 2 permits an insight into the changing roles of the 
several institutions and programs comprising the agricultural 
credit supply network during the 1970s, The sources are 
classifi~d intq the farm size categories that most typically 
reflect the majority of their portfolio. 2 From this profile 
it can be seen that large farmers benefited handsomely from the 
agricultural credit initiatives in Jamaica during the 1970s. 3 
Commercial banks and the Jamaica Development Bank increased their 
relative portfolio substantially until 1977 while, at the other 
end of the spectrum, the small farmer oriented Agricultural 
Credit-Board Peoples Cooperative Bank program lost ground 
markedly. In 1977 and 1978 there was an improvement in the credit 
status of small farmers. Two factors accounted for the later 
shift: first, the Crop Lien Program was established and people's 
cooperative bank credit expanded; second, commercial banks reduced 
their lending to agriculture. The Crop Lien Program was the 
largest1source of credit increase during that year, eclipsing 
the customarily dominant role of commercial banks within the total 
portfolio. No doubt the substantial erosion of the older s.mall 
farmer credit line through the Agricultural ~redi t Boc3:rd _ha·i caused. 
2oetailed c.:r~formation on the size . distrib-~~ic l of loss is 
provided in Table 6 of Graham and Bourne · ( 19 79) • 
3Again allowance must be made her~ for the large relative increase 
in commercial bank loans from 1974 to 1976 (Panel A, Table 4)in 
part due to the reclassification of agricultural loans in 1975 
discussed in the previous footnote. Nevertheless there was a 
large unambiguous rise from 1971 to 1974. 
-.;_ ~'" 
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sufficient concern and grievances that a new initiative and e· 
program was felt necessary to redress this imbalance. Unfortunately 
this initiative led to substantial problems of default as we 
shall see shortly. 
In addition to the large vs. small farmer profile depicted 
in Table 2, there is a foreign vs. domestic resource division 
that merits discussion. A large proportion of the loanable 
resources of the Jamaica Development Bank and the Self-Supporting 
Farmers Development Program come from foreign sources (i.e~, the 
World Bank and Caribbean Development Bank in the former case and 
the Inter-American Development Bank in the latter case) • 
Domestic sources are almost exclusively geared to short term 
seasonal loans (through commercial banks, the Agricultural Credit 
Board and Crop Lien Program) while foreign resources are 
earmarked for medium to long term developmental loans (the Jamaica 
Development Bank and the Self-Supporting Farmers Development 
Program). In 1970, the rural financial market expanded to include 
the new, internationally financed Jamaica Development Bank and 
the Self-Supporting Farmers Development Program. Whereas in 
1969 they played no role whatsoever, these institutions were 
the most rapidly growing sources of funding for agricultural 
credit between 1974 and 1978. The role of international resources 
was crucial to the expansion of total credit supply during the 
1970s, and more importantly, indispensable towards lengthening 
the term structure to include developmental financing. However, 
growing problems of delinquency and declining foreign exchange 
~-
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TABLE 2 
Selected Data <;m Loan Activity by Farm Size. 
and Source ,)f Loa.ns· in ·;Jamaica · 
ll1iring the• 1970s 
9 
A. Percentage Distribution .of Total Agricultural Loans 
Outstanding at End· of Year by Farm Size Categories 
And Source for Selected Years in Jamaica 
Farm Size and Sources 
11. l.arg<' r,1rmcrs and 
_'.-ooperntives 
(a) Commercial Banks 
(h) ACB-Direct Loans 
to Farmers 
(c) Jamaica Dev. Bank 
JI. Medium-Sized Farmers 
(a) Self-Supporting 
Farmer Development 
Prof); ram 
lTl. Small Farmers 
(a) ACll--PeopLcs Coop. 
llanks Loans 
(h) Crop Lien ·Program 
(Min. Agric.) 
TOTAL (%) 
TOTAL (J$MN) 
1971 
(1) 
% 
45.8 
39 .• 1 
4.7 
2.0 
13.2 
13.2 
40.9 
100.0 
30.5 
1974 
(2) 
% 
60.8 
44.2 
4.2 
12.4 
16.2 
16.2 
22.9 
22.9 
Years 
1976 
(3) 
% 
3.0 
14.2 
11.5 
ll.O 
100.0 100.0 
60.l 136.7 
1977 
(4) 
% 
72;0 
54.4 
2.9 
14.7 
12.7 
12.7 
15.2 
9.5 
5.7 
100.0 
165.8 
1978 
(5) 
% 
68.2 
48.8 
3.4 
16.0 
14.9' 
14.9 
16.9 
9.9 
7.0 
100.0 
167.8 
.ll. Percentage llistri.hution of the Annual Cha)lge in Loans 
Outstanding to Agriculture (from January 1st to 31st 
Dcce·mbcr) hy Farm Size Categories and Sources for 
Selected Years in Jamaica 
I. Large Farmers and 
Cooperatives 
(a) Commercial llanks 
(h) /\CB-Direct Loans 
to farmers 
(c) .lam:ti.c11 Dev. flank 
·11. Ml•dium-Sized F11n111-rs 
(<i) Scl f -Support in:~ 
T•'armt'r Developmen~ 
Prog_rnm 
TTL Small Farmers 
(a) /\CB-Peoples Coop • 
. Bank Loans 
(h) Crop Li.en Program 
(Min. /\grfr.) 
TOTAL (%) 
TOTAL (J$MN) 
1971 
(1) 
% 
54.9 
36.0 
8.3 
IO.Ii 
'lli. 7 
3q.7 
1974 
(2) 
% 
76.0 
17.2 
17.2 
17.2 
Years 
1976 
(3) 
% 
80.2 
47.2 
2.1 
}0. 7 
16.8 
16.8 
9.2 .~ ~ 
9.2 6.9 3.0 
100.0 100.0 100.0 
5.2 ;11.0 24;0 
1977 
(!•) 
%. 
1978 
(5) 
% 
46.9 -221.2 
27.4 -453.7 
2.4 46.9 
17. l 185. (, 
18.2 159.5 
18.2 1.59 •. 5 
161.5 
2. ~ 38.9 
31. 9 122 .6 
100.0 100.0 
29.l 1.9 
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earnings raise serious questions as to whether Jamaica.will 
•• be able to secure new international financing·for these activities 
or, for that matter, even service the current debt obligations. 
incurred on past loans from the international .agencies. this .. ·. 
will be discussed further in a later section. 
C. Performance 
It is useful to assess the performance of the system as a 
whole. Column 2 of Table 3 underlines the fact that total 
credit has been rising substantially as a percent of gross 
domestic product since the early 1970s. This reflects the 
growing rate of inflationary financing in the economy through 
substantial increases in the money supply. Agricultural credit 
per se slightly declined as a proportion of total credit 
(panel A, Col. 1). However, from 1975 to 1977, it has been 
growing more rapidly than total credit. (For reasons cited 
in footnotes 1 and 2, the only unambiguous trends are those 
from 1970 to 1974 and from 1975 to 1977.) The agricultural 
credit/agricultural GDP ratio (Col.3) increased from 32 to 
roughly 37 percent in the earlier subperiod and from 56 to 
63 pe·rcent between 1975 and 1977. This rising average ratio 
of agricultural credit to agricultural gross domestic product 
implies an even higher marginal agricultural credit-agricultural 
GDP ratio. As a result of the credit slowdown (Column 1, Table 3), 
the average credit ratio decreased substantially in 1978. 
• 
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TABLE 3 
,Credit Ratios and Implicit Credit Subsidy For 
The Jamaican Agricultural Credit System in Recent .Years 
A. Credit Ratios 
Agricultural Credit/ 
Year Total Credit · 
Total Credit/ 
Total GDP 
Agricultural Credit/ 
Agricultural GDP 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
7.8 
7.6 
6.4 
6.8 
6.5 
9.1 
8.9 
9.9 
7.8 
27.2 
30.8 
31.5 
41.2 
41.2 
46.7 
55.3 
61.1 
62.1 
32.3 
30.7 
33.0 
38.2 
36.9 
55.9 
60.l 
62.6 
53.2 
B. Estimates of Real Rate of Interest for Agricultural 
Credit and Implicit Credit Subsidy As Percent Of 
Agricultural GDP 
Rate of Avg.Nominal 
Year Inflation Interest Rate 
Agric.Loans 
Real Rate 
of Interest 
(Col.2-Col.l) 
Agr.Credit/ 
Agr.GDP 
Credit 
Subsidy as 
% of Agric. 
GDP(l) 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
15.7 
8.2 
14.0 
27.9 
10.0 
10.0 
10.0 
10.0 
- 5~7 
+ 1.8 
- 4.0 
-17.9 
55.8 
60.1 
62.6 
53.2 
Sources: Statistical Digest (Bank of Jamaica), various years; 
National Income and Product (Department of Statistics), 
various years. 
Notes for Pan~l C: , (1) Subsidy as a percent of Agric. GDP is 
estimated by taking the proportion of total 
outstanding agricultural credit to total 
agricultural GDP (column 4) and multiplying 
this by the negative rate 0f interest 
(column 3)~ For this exer ise, the 
appropriate measure of inf ation is the 
implit!it GDP deflater. 
3.2 
0 
2.5 
9.3 
12 . 
. . 
The ratio of agricultural credit.to agricultural GDP has • 
been rising in recent years because of the "deadwood syndrome", 
Many of the loans outstanding are deadwood, that is, in permanent 
default on the one hand, and very likely permanently diverted to 
non-agricultural uses on the other hand. The high and rising 
credit/GDP ratio when combined with high and rising delinquency 
strongly suggest that farm loans are either not being applied to 
agricultural activities or, are being applied inefficiently when 
compared to earlier years. Given the growing stagnation in the 
economy as a whole, it is possible that much of this credit may 
be leaking out of the economy as capital flight as well as into 
real estate, land and other inflationary hedges. This indicates 
the need for a reform of the credit strategies adopted in recent 
years, a topic to which we will return in the final section. 
The final issue warranting discussion in this section is 
the implicit subsidy built into the current credit programs. 
Panel B of Table 2 present estimates of the real rate of 
interest for agricultural credit. The average interest rate 
charged for agricultural credit (from a low of three to seven 
percent in government programs to 13 to 14 percent in commercial 
banks)· is clearly below the average rate of inflation (Col. 2 vs. 
Col. 1) • The net result is a negative real rate of interest 
(Col. 3) which in recent years has been rising dramatically. 
Furthermore, if one multiplies the real rate of interest times 
the agricultural credit/agricultural GDP ratio one can estimate 
13 
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• the implicit credit subsidy as a percent of agricultural GDP. 
• 
Column 5 shows that in 1978 this rea.ched 9 percent, .a high 
·level by any·standard. 
Thus,· not only does credit appear to be increasingly used. 
in an inappropri~te (i.e., non agricultural) or inefficient 
fashion, but also the beneficiaries or borrowers are enjoying 
a sizable subsidy. The social costs of this credit strategy 
could be substantial if, ·as indicated earlier, relatively large 
borrowers form an important part of the credit portfolio. This 
calls for a more detailed evaluation of the performance of the 
major institutions and programs comprising the national system 
of agricultural credit in Jamaica • 
III. Institutional Performance: The Question 
of Arrears and Institutional Viability 
In evaluating the performance of the Jamaican rural financial 
market an important question is whether the institutions and 
programs are financially viable. Central to the issue of 
viability is the loan repayment experience of lenders. Table 3 
summarizes the arrears record for all the Jamaican institutions 
and programs. The commercial banks have respectable recovery 
rates (i.e.; low arrears rates). However, all the public sector 
programs re.cord alarmingly high arrears rates. This raises 
a serious question as to whether any of the latter programs 
are financially viable. To plac~ this issue ii. context it is 
helpful to discuss the large farmer and small farmer programs 
separately even though.the arrears are high in both cases. 
I. 
II. 
. TABLE 3 
Arrears Ratios for Selected Agricultural Credit 
.· · Institutions and Programs in Jamaica 
In the Mid to Late 1970s 
• I 
14,. 
Arrears on Arrears to Total 
Amounts Due Loan·s Outstandin~ 
(1) (2) 
Commercial Banks (l) 
i) 1978 4. 4 <2 ) 4. 4 <2 ) 
Public Sector Agricultural 
Credit Programs 
A. Jamaica Development 
Bank (Commercial window) 
1) 1974 N/A 2.2 
2) 1976 81.2 8.2 
3) 1978 82.6 19.6 
B. Self-Supporting Farmer 
Development Program (SSFDP) 
1) 1978 38.0 18.0 
c. Agricultural Credit Board 
(People's Cooperative Banks) 
1) 1978 N/A 39.0 
D. Crop Lien Program 
(Ministry of Agriculture) 
1) 1978 94.6 <3 > 94.6 <3 > 
Notes: l) From files of anonymous commercial bank in Jamaica 
in 1978. 
sourc~~= 
2) Commercial Banks classify a debt as in danger or 
"arrears" due to a variety of factors in the sub-
jective judgment of a loan officer. The loan does 
not have to be formally "due" to be classified and, 
conversely, a loan may be beyond the due date but.not 
be in danger of non-payment and hence riot classified. 
3) Amounts Due and Loans Outstanding a.re the same here. 
This is a seasonal loan program. · · 
From Loan Files of the Institutions or. Programs in 
Question. 
• 
• 
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B·. The Large Farmer Arrears Issue · 
~The JOB arrears .experience is a classic case .of the large 
farmer delinquency problem. The J:P)?was originally established 
in 1970 to service the medium to lQng run developmental peeds of 
fairly large capital intensive activities i_n the tradition of 
"modernizing" a·griculture through capital intensive investments 
in the form of creating dairy or beef herds, installing dairy 
equipment, tractors, pumps, new pastures, fencing, wells, irriga-
tion, new plantation crops, etc. These investments were financed 
by large loans which represented a substantial part of annual 
net flows of agricultural credit. Therefore, any serious 
problem in delinquency in this program affected an important 
component of the total credit portfolio and, moreover, one that 
is allegedly on the "cutting edge" of the modernization drive 
in Jamaican agriculture. 
The Bank did not design its accounts in such a way as to 
detect the arrears on the amounts due until recently when 
pressed to do so by its international creditors. Internal failings 
partly account for the repayment difficulties. experienced by the 
Jamaica Development Bank. It is clear that insufficient attention 
was paid to designing appropriate arrears measures arid setting up 
the machinery to implement effective and timely collections. At 
the same time there was clearly a def;iciency in loan appraisals 
despite the early emphasis on staf£:ing this d5vision at the 
expense .of. the collection division. Arbitrar:1 interference with 
established loan review procedures became common under the former 
Managing-Director of the Bank. In retrospect I the institution has e 
paid dearly for this behavior with rising arrears rates and low 
4 
staff morale. Growing resistance to repayment very likely has 
played a role in farmer behavior as a result of the disclosures 
about the Bank's management (which they were privy to beforehand 
in any event), and the feeling that they could get away with it. 
A comment is in order on the policy of the international 
agencies. One cannot help but conclude that the Jamaica Develop-
ment Bank obtained more loan funds from these sources than it 
could manage. This is frequently a problem in these programs. 
The Jamaica Development Bank found it difficult to exercise any 
self-discipline in this situation and probably had little idea 
of how much it could manage effectively since it did not have any 
prior experience in administering these kinds of developmental 
loans. Ultimately in these kinds of circumstances, more 
responsibility is placed on international lenders if only to 
protect their loan capital. It would appear that in this case the 
responsibility was too lightly regarded. 
The macroeconomic behavior of the economy contributed to the 
arrears problems by depressing gross incomes and the debt repay-
ment ability of farmers 5 • Domestic price inflation generated 
4This state of affairs became known through the Auditor Generals 
reports in 1978 and 1979 reviewing the issues of conflict of 
interest and mismanagement in the JDB. The results of these 
findings have been made public in the Daily Gleaner. newspaper. 
5This issue is fully discussed in Bourne and Graham (1980). 
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• substantial increases in agricultural wage rates (Table 4, Col. 1) • 
Prices of capital services and current non-labor inputs also 
increased substantially, partly because of price increases by 
foreign suppliers but also because of exchange rate devaluations 
• 
• 
in 1977 and 1978. (For example, import prices for chemical 
fertilizers in Column 2, Table 4). Agricultural product prices 
did not increase sufficiently to offset increases in factor 
prices plus declines in farm productivity, as can be seen from 
Table 4, Columns 4 to 7. Quantitative import restrictions induced 
by the balance of payments crisis made matters worse for farmers 
by reducing the supply of imported inputs and consequently 
agricultural output. As a result, gross profits were seriously 
squeezed. Real operating surplus declined in 1974, 1975 and 
1978. Finally, the exchange rate devaluations increased the local 
currency values of farm debts funded by international agencies. 
c. The Small Farmer Arrears Problem 
Table 3 shows that the arrears performance of the small 
farmer credit programs, with one exception, is not any better 
than that for the large farmer Jamaica Development Bank program. 
In effect, the delinquency problem affects all public sector 
programs. The old line Agricultural Credit Board-People's 
Cooperative Bank program records about a 40 percent arrears in 
relation to loans outstanding. Not surprisingly the accounts 
are not designed to create an arrears measure on accounts due. 
No doubt the latter measure is considerably h:igher since there are 
medium term loans within its portfolio. 
•I 
Year 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
AVG 
Source: 
Per Worker 
Income 
n.a. 
n.a. 
12 
25 
39 
3 
7 
22 
18 
TABLE 4 
Annual Percentage Changes in Farm Input Prices and Supplies, 
Farm Productivity and Farm Profits 
Import Quantity Productivity 
Price of Index of Land Domestic Sugar Bananna 
Fertilizer Fertilizer Sugar Food Crops Import Export 
Im:eorts Cane Price Price 
32 46 - 5 7 3 6 
27 20 - 3 2 22 0 
..,. 9 49 1 2 11 62 
132 -11 - 1 3 31 5 
1 15 
- 7 4 100 35 
-48 - 6 4 - 6 -56 -28 
42 -23 - 2 11 32 44 
45 - 4 10 2 29 59 
28 11 - 1 3 21 23 
Computed from data in: a) Jamaica Department of Statistics 
Labor Force; External Trade Re:eort; National Income and Product Accounts; 
Food Crop 
Farm 
Gate 
Prices 
23 
2 
37 
33 
26 
8 
35 
- 2 
20 
Year Book of Jamaica. b) National Planning Agency Economic and Social Survey. 
c) Ministry of Agriculture Indices of Domestic Agricultural Production and 
Farm Gate Prices. d) Bank of Jamaica Balance of Payments. 
---
Note: The decline in prices of imported fertilizer in 1976 is attributable to 
very large notional cost imports under bilateral aid agreements. 
• .. • 
Real 
Gross 
Profits 
24 
2 
7 
- 5 
- 4 
1 
6 
' 
- 8 ·--;~·. 
4 
~ .... 
00 ~ 
.. 
•• 
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9 The relative importance of the Agricultural Credit Board 
program has declined through time. Its reputation has suffered 
as a result of its longstanding arrears problem. Annual reports 
are intermittent and irregular. Accounting and managerial practices 
are deficient and loan appraisal and collection procedures 
perfunctory. The Self-Supporting Farmers Development Program, 
originally established within the Agricultural Credit Board in 
1969, was transferred into the Jamaica Development Bank in 1974. 
Government budgetary support to cover the Agricultural Credit 
Board overhead, deficits and new loan capital has diminished in 
the face of competing demands by newer programs in the public 
sector. As a result there has been a decline in the real 
resources available for loans in this program during the 1970s. 
Finally, when the Crop Lien Program was established in 1977, 
it was located in the Ministry of Agriculture instead of the 
Agricultural Credit Board. At present the institution is 
engaged in a holding action on a diminishing base of real 
resources. 
The Crop Lien Program is the most recent initiative to 
reach the small farmer. Launched in 1977 in an effort to 
stimulate local foodstuff production and save on foreign exchange 
for food imports, the program was widely publicized and, 
apparently did reach a large number of farmers. The program 
was strictly short term and seasonal •. Roughl' $9.5 million 
were disbursed to some 30,000 farmers. Alleg dly farmers with 
- ----- -------------------
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commercial bank, Jamaica Development-Bank, or Self""'. 
Supporting Farmers Development Program .loans were ineligible. 
Ministry o:f Agriculture extension _agents engaged in the loan 
appraisals which were rather casual and.perfunctory. Repayment$ 
" 
were expected to be voluntary with little if any inducement 
needed but, as is clear from Table 3, by financial standards, 
the program was a complete failure with only a six percent recovery 
rate (i.e., 94 percent arrears rate) after one and a half years 
of operation. Clearly a "grants" mentality was operating here 
with no serious sanctions for default, and, one might add, 
no serious consequences for the public officials responsible 
for designing the program with its inbuilt failure for 
effective loan recovery. 
The Self-Supporting Farmers Development Program is currently 
the only public sector credit program with a modicum of success. 
• 
The arrears rate in this program is 38 percent for the amounts r. 
due and 18 percent for loans outstanding. Only in comparison to 
the Jamaica Development Bank, the Agricultural Credit Board or 
Crop Lien Programs, is this a very respectable performance. More-
over, the lower arrears ratio comes with a price, namely, a high 
supervisory overhead that is largely absent in the other programs. 
A highly decentralized set of field officers- with separate sta.ffs 
for loan appraisal, technical assistance and loan collection 
guarantee a close monitoring of. loans by field personnel who. 
are close to the farmer and local conditions. This is in sharp 
contrast .to the Jamaica Development Bank operations in which all 
these operations are conducted out of one central office. • 
• 
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• In summary, small farmer loan programs in Jamaica have been 
• 
.. 
difficult to design and implement successfully. High arrears 
rates are common and a "grants" mentality difficult to overcome. 
Political support for non-repayment among many politicans 
reinforces this behavior and makes it even more difficult for 
public officials to correct the situation. The absence of 
effective sanctions (since foreclosures are either difficult or 
legally impossible depending on the program) and, at the same 
time, the absence of public accountability for poorly designed 
programs practically guarantee failure. 
The only strategy that has been moderately successful to 
date is a highly expensive supervisory credit program that 
monitors (or pressures) the farmer so frequently that it prevents 
arrears from getting more seriously out of hand. The overhead 
supervisory costs in this program appear to offset to some extent 
·the otherwise high arrears that would invariably emerge without 
it. A highly subsidized supervised credit program like the Self,.. 
Supporting Farmers Development Program which at least inculcates 
more responsible repayment behavior and effectively implements 
on-farm investments is preferable to an equally subsidized non-
supervisory program (like the Agricultural Credit Board and 
Crop Lien) that saves on supervisory costs but generates high 
delinquency, poor credit attitudes and probably a diversion of 
resources to non-farm uses. 
IV. Conclusions 
• Jamaica, in the 1970s, has shifted between a planners and a 
bankers perspective on agricultural credit strategies. This 
struggle is still not resolved. The planners and characteristically 
the plan-oriented Ministry of Agriculture have alwasys viewed 
credit from the credit use approach. After the physical 
production targets have been established concerning how much 
agricultural output is desired, all policy instruments including 
credit are directed to that end. Credit programs are launched 
to service these production programs. The most recent example 
is the Crop Lien Program. Nonrepayment of loans is considered 
of lesser importance that substantially increased domestic 
) 
foodstuff production. There is an implicit assumption that 
the opportunity cost of public funds is low. The planners 
approach invariably transforms credit programs into income 
transfers and rationalizes their results after the fact. 
The bankers perspective is l~ss concerned with production 
per se and more concerned with institutional viability. Bankers 
are more concerned with the proper evaluations and administration 
of loans, concerned about charging a sufficient rate of interest 
to cover costs, determined to protect their cash flow through 
low arrears (emphasizing collateral and foreclosure) , and tend 
to be pessimistic about the possibilities of servicing the credit 
needs of small farmers without extensive monitoring, supervision 
and collection machinery. The Jamaican Development Bank and 
Self-Supporting Farmers Development Program credit strategies 
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• ref le ct this thinking. However, in the case of the former, 
poor performance has not only damaged this institution but 
compromised the credit strategy as well. At present the 
current impasse between· the planners and.bankers approach is 
at a stand-off with no firm political direction being offered 
by the government to resolve this dilemma. 
.. 
Public sector credit delivery to small farmers has proven 
difficult in most countries and Jamaica is no exception. The 
possibility of achieving this goal without compromising the 
finanacial viability of the institutions offering this service 
is slim. Quick and widespread dissemination of loans invariahly 
transforms these credit programs into ad-hoc income transfer 
programs. On the other hand, careful, expensive supervision 
of small farmer loans may reduce arrears but the high operating 
costs limit the scope of the program and, in the end, may not 
be much more cost-effective than a low cost unsupervised program 
with high defaults unless the loan recovery rate is high. 
More helpful would be a package of agricultural policies 
that distributed inputs in kind at subsidized cost and promoted 
minimum price programs and marketing arrangements that would 
reduce the risk of income variance. Minimum prices affect all 
farmers equally whereas subsidized credit programs are invariably 
rationed and, in the end, only favor those who have access to 
the credit institutions. Policies promoting · 1ff farm employment 
and income opportunities in rural areas could also.improve the 
economic welfare of small farm families. Also, one should not 
. ·L, 
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forget that informal credit channels are very likely servicing • 
small farmers more extensively than is commonly known. In light 
o.f this, the social return to the use of public sector resources 
would be .higher if applied in a,combination.of the abovepolicy 
measures to reach small farmers rather than drained off into 
ineffectively and inequitably administered credit programs with 
high default rates. 
The pathology of economic stagnation is currently constraining 
the prospects for financial reforms and recovery in Jamaica. 
Under more normal circumstances the growing pattern of distortions 
in the financial sector which cause negative real rates of 
interest and inequitable credit subsidies could be dealt with 
' 
through interest rate reforms. The declining rate of savings 
and implicit taxation of small savers for the benefit of larger 
borrowers could be corrected through the same reforms. By. raising 
savings deposit rates of interest sufficiently to promote a 
positive rate of interest, savers would no longer be penalized. 
At the same time banks could protect their operating margins by 
raising their loan rates to borrowers, charging an interest rates 
that more closely correspond to the true opportunity cost of 
capital and eliminating the unfair advantage borrowers currently 
enjoy with negative real rates o.f interest. Public sec-tor 
programs could also limit the drain on government resources 
• 
by raising interest rates to more adequately reflect the opportunity 
cost of government funds. 
The constraint on this otherwise sensible strategy is the 
..... 
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• 
• weak demarid for loans in the face of a severe economic. · 
• 
• 
• 
recession. ·.The high level of excess liquidity in the 
commercial banking network suggests that banks would be 
unable to find customers at significantly higher loan rates 
until overall inflation is effectively controlled and economic 
recovery underway. Furthermore, the economic recession and 
factor and product price distortions have undermined debt 
servicing apility. Lenders are hard put to recover their 
capital, much less increase loan charges. One common way to 
deal with this state of affairs is to institute a rigorous 
stabilization program which promotes an expansion of exports, 
sharp devaluations, wage cont;ols, budgetary constraints,· 
indexing for inflation, and drastic· financial decompression • 
Successful implementation usually takes several years, during 
which there is the inevitable popular but socially costly 
reaction against the short term results. 
Thus the prospects for rapidly eliminating the ineq~itable 
and inefficient credit subsidies currently built into the 
negative real rate of interest setting are slim. This less 
than ideal structure of interest rates is bound to remain in 
place until inflation is reduced or some indexing formula 
adopted, both being unlikely events in p.i;:esent day Jamaica. 
This implies that savings will continue to be penalized and 
various forms of non-price rationing utilized to allocate 
public sector credit. The growth in the supp. y of agricultural 
credit will be much slower than in the .ea:rly and mid 1970s 
with a much smaller number of farmers serviced. Only a 
significant reduction in inflation and modest economic 
recovery can create the conditions that could modify this 
pessimistic scenario, creating the policy space that would 
permit the financial reforms that are so necessary in Jamaica. 
• 
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